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Abstract. The aim of the paper is to provide a solution which increases the security of a mobile
environment for both individuals and for workers in an enterprise. The proposed solution adapts
Shamir’s approach for sharing a secret for encryption key management. One part of the key is
stored on a Bluetooth or NFC wristband or on an enterprise server, while a mobile device is used
to store all the rest. The approach can be applied for both securing documents and voice data.
The solution is supported by a mathematical formality which is missing in the currently known
advice within cryptographic folklore.
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1 Motivation
Despite the fact that nobody would dispute that the storage of cryptographic keys is
a very important part of data protection, there has been no significant progress in this
direction as yet. Essentially, all advice is at the cryptographic folklore level. A digest of
advice can, for example, be found in OWASP (WEB, a):
– Ensure that any secret key is protected from unauthorized access.
– Define a key lifecycle.
– Store unencrypted keys away from the encrypted data.
– Use independent keys when multiple keys are required.
– Protect keys in a key vault.
– Document concrete procedures for managing keys through the lifecycle.
– Build support for changing keys periodically.
– Document concrete procedures to handle a key compromise.
– Rekey data at least every one to three years.
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– Protect any keys used to secure cardholder data against disclosure and misuse.
– Fully document and implement all key-management processes and procedures for
cryptographic keys used for encryption of cardholder data.
The abovementioned advice mandates that key management processes should cover
8 specific key lifecycle steps:
1. Generation of strong cryptographic keys.
2. Secure cryptographic key distribution.
3. Secure cryptographic key storage.
4. Periodic cryptographic key changes.
5. Retirement or replacement of keys as deemed necessary when the integrity of
the key has been weakened or keys are suspected of being compromised.
6. Split knowledge and establishment of dual control of cryptographic keys.
7. Prevention of unauthorized substitution of cryptographic keys.
8. Requirement for cryptographic key custodians to sign a form stating that they
understand and accept their key-custodian responsibilities.
The fact that the advice on the storage of keys is at the folklore level is partially
due to the lack of an adequate description of the situation which can fit into some
mathematical formalism.
But, the problem is that the standard user is unable to either remember the folklore
advice or to follow it. It means that a solution which is sufficiently simple has to be
found, while taking into account all of the abovementioned restrictions.
Our aim is to show how it’s possible to ensure that both individual users and work-
ers at an enterprise don’t have to puzzle over issues which are not within their compe-
tence. To reach this aim the authors have adopted Shamir’s approach for sharing a secret
(Shamir, 1979): the secret is some data D. Divide D into n pieces D1, D2, . . . , Dn in
such a way that:
(1) knowledge of any κ or more Di pieces makes D easily computable;
(2) knowledge of any κ − 1 or fewer Di pieces leaves D completely undetermined (in
the sense that all its possible values are equally likely).
The authors propose considering the use of an encryption key as the secret data D from
Shamir’s approach for encryption key management in a mobile environment. We need
n = κ = 2.
2 Document Encryption
Split the encryption key k into two parts, k1 and k2, so that there is no possibility
of restoring a key if any of the parts are missing. A Bluetooth or NFC (Near Field
Communication) wristband is used for storing the encrypted k2. A smartphone is used
for storing the remainder. That is all that the user has to care for. The whole document
encryption process will be carried out by a mobile application on the smartphone.
Now we will describe the details that a user friendly application loaded into a smart-
phone must provide. At first a decision should be made as to which cryptosystems will
be used.
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The authors propose that two different cryptosystems should be used for increasing
security. Nowadays RC4–like stream cipher (Spritz) is considered to be good enough
(see the latest research Rivest, Schuldt (2014), Ros¸ie (2015)). We do not insist on one
specific cryptosystem as best of all. For more stream ciphers see (WEB, b) and see
(WEB, c) for block ciphers. We recommend one system should be used for document
encryption, the second one — for communication. Thus two different cryptosystems
are loaded into the smartphone:
K1 = 〈P1, C1,K1, E1,D1〉,
K2 = 〈P2, C2,K2, E2,D2〉
Here for both i ∈ {1, 2}
– Pi — plaintext space;
– Ci — ciphertext space;
– Ki — key space;
– Ei : P ×K → Ci — a set of encryption functions;
– Di : C ×K → Pi — a set of decryption functions
and for every plaintext x ∈ Pi, every key k ∈ Ki is valid
Di(Ei(x, k), k) = x .
If one cryptosystem K1 is used instead of K1 and K2 then K1 6= K2 at least .
For every document Di a cryptosystem K1 key Ki1 is generated, which is used for
document Di encryption, namely,
D′i = E1(Di,Ki1).
Key Ki1 is split into two independent parts K ′i1 and K ′′i1 so that
Ki1 = A(K
′
i1,K
′′
i1),
where A — algorithm, restoring key Ki1, if its parts K ′i1 and K ′′i1 are given. The re-
quirement is that key Ki1 cannot be restored, if only one part of the key parts K ′i1, or
K ′′i1 is known.
Cryptosystem K2 keys K ′i2 and K ′′i2 are generated. The halves of key Ki1 are en-
crypted, namely,
Si1 = E2(K ′i1,K ′i2),
Si2 = E2(K ′′i1,K ′′i2).
D′i,K
′′
i2, Si1 are stored in the smartphone, whileK ′i2, Si2 are stored in the Bluetooth
or NFC wristband (see Fig.1.).
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Mobile device
D′i,K
′′
i2, Si1
Programmable Bluetooth
or NFC device
K ′i2, Si2
✻
Fig.1. Splitting of the key.
If a user wants to read the document Di, then the user has to enter the password (a
security measure for the situation where a mobile device is also used by other persons,
let’s say, family members), and only then does the application address the wristband,
loading K ′i2, Si2, and decrypting the halves of key Ki1
K ′i1 = D2(Si1,K ′i2),
K ′i2 = D2(Si2,K ′′i2),
restoring the document’s Di encrypted key
Ki1 = A(K
′
i1,K
′
i2);
and finally decrypting the document
Di = D1(D′i,Ki1).
As soon as the document is decrypted, the application deletes (destroys) all the data
used for the decryption of the document which should not be stored on the mobile de-
vice, namely, the keys Ki1,K ′i1,K ′′i1,K ′i2,K ′′i2 and encrypted keys Si1, Si2. Work with
memory must be organized depending of the specific hardware to really destroy mis-
sion critical data. Decrypted document Di is deleted (destroyed) when the user finishes
reading the document. Only D′i,K ′′i2, Si1 should remain on the smartphone after the
particular document has been read (see Fig. 2.). Otherwise after reading the document
becomes unsecure.
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Fig.2. Reading of document Di.
Where a mobile device has been lost, unauthorized access to encrypted documents
is not possible, assuming that the wristband has also not been lost. Our solution does
not exclude the usage of other security measures, see, for example (WEB, d); Gorbans,
Kulesovs, Straujums, Buls (2015).
3 Encryption of Enterprise Documents and Voice Calls
Users can use their connection with an enterprise server instead of the wristband for
the encryption of enterprise documents. This eliminates the risk arising from the loss of
a wristband and allows the disabling of communication with the lost or stolen mobile
device. In this case, the keys are generated on a secure enterprise server. K ′i2 and Si2
are kept there now as well. Using this approach, a user has to take into account that
encrypted documents are not available offline, but this issue should be solved separately.
As opposed to the reading of documents, voice calls should be encrypted and de-
crypted in real time to avoid delays. In general, there are no serious barriers to encrypt-
ing voice calls nowadays. It should be noted, that mobile networking already goes from
an analogue to a digital mode, and traffic is encrypted if the call moves within an LTE
network. But, the encryption process is controlled by the carrier’s mobile tower. That is
why an enterprise cannot be 100% sure that encryption has really taken place between
the phone and the tower, and that the call has also been transferred in an encrypted way
between other towers, especially if they belong to another carrier.
In order to provide enterprise users with operative networking, we recommend a
solution similar to the one already proposed for private needs. Two different cryptosys-
tems are uploaded to the server:
K3 = 〈P3, C3,K3, E3,D3〉,
K4 = 〈P4, C4,K4, E4,D4〉.
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Let’s assume that communication should be established between ν employees. The
m sets are prepared for each pair of i, j employees. The first set is used for the first call,
the second set — for the second call, etc. If i employee calls j employee for time k,
then the application automatically loads the k-th set Kk′ij4, Skij2 from the wristband and
renews the key Kkij1. This key is used for call encryption and decryption. When the call
is completed or if the connection has been unsuccessful, then set Kk′ij4,Kk
′′
ij4, S
k
ij1, S
k
ij2
is deleted.
The mν(ν−1)2 various key sets are generated K
t
ij3,K
t′
ij4,K
t′′
ij4, where Ktij3 is the
cryptosystem K3 key used for the encryption of a call t between i and j employees.
Keys Ktij3 are divided into two independent parts Kt
′
ij3 and Kt
′′
ij3. It is done in such a
way that
Ktij3 = A(K
t′
ij3,K
t′′
ij3),
where A is an algorithm that renews key Ktij3 if its parts, Kt
′
ij3 and Kt
′′
ij3, are given.
Keys Kt′ij4 and Kt
′′
ij4 of the cryptosystem K4 are generated. The halves of key Ktij3
are encrypted, namely,
Stij1 = E4(Kt
′
ij3,K
t′
ij4),
Stij2 = E4(Kt
′′
ij3,K
t′′
ij4).
Kt
′′
ij4 and Stij1 are kept on the smartphone whileKt
′
ij4 and Stij2 are kept on the wristband.
There is one encryption characteristic worth mentioning. If there is no need to keep
a recorded call in an encrypted way, then such a protocol is not needed either. In this
case it is enough to choose one cryptosystem K3 and to prepare m encryption keys
Ktij3 for each i, j pair. It is clear that if call k has taken place or a connection has been
unsuccessful, then key Kkij3 must be destroyed.
The enterprise server serves the main role in call encryption key generation and the
initial distribution. Furthermore, the distribution of keys occurs at the premises of the
enterprise. If the number of employees ν is not very large (not exceeding, for exam-
ple, 100) and an attack that blocks calls is not expected, then the protocol offered is
practically secure.
A more severe risk is connected to the key generation algorithm. The following sit-
uation could be an example of risk exposure. Let’s suppose that the procedure generates
only 240 keys, when it was advertised to users that the generator would generate 2256
independent keys. The user cannot identify the fraud in a direct way, because it could
take quite a lot of time to test the generator. Just imagine if, for example, each key is
generated in one second. This is why we recommend that enterprises should create key
generators themselves.
If there is no generator software available, then key generation can be done manu-
ally. Anyway each cryptosystem need keys with specific properties. We shall demon-
strate the method how can be generated a key that contains approximately equal number
0 and 1 in the key. A key could be generated using a card deck. Take 52 cards, mix them
up, and throw one or two cards out. Take the cards from the deck one by one. If a card is
red, then choose 0. If a card is black, then choose 1. A key (or part of key) with a length
of 50 or 51 is generated. Repeat the whole procedure just described again and combine
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the parts. A key with a length of 203 (4 parts combined) is considered to be practically
secure.
The method suggested could be seen to be comically primitive, and thus not secure
by a non-specialist. But, (
2n
n
)
∼ 4
n
√
pin
This is well known asymptotic approximation (see, for example (WEB, e)). For standard
52–card deck n = 522 = 26. We recommend to throw one or two cards out therefore it
is possible to generate about
(425)4
(pi25)2
≥ 2187
different keys using the suggested method. Such a method could be used by a user who
needs to encrypt 2–3 documents. But this method is not suitable for an enterprise which
needs to encrypt thousands of documents each day.
4 Conclusions
We have adapted Shamir’s approach to share a secret (Shamir (1979)) for encryption
key management in a mobile environment. An encryption key of sufficient length is
generated and split into two independent parts. This is used to encrypt a document
or voice call. Part of the key is kept in a smartphone, while another part is kept in a
Bluetooth or NFC wristband. Part of the key is kept in the wristband which is why
decryption of a document is not possible without that part.
The fact that part of the key is kept in a wristband in an encrypted way prevents
an attacker from gaining any significant benefit, even if traffic between the wristband
and smartphone is intercepted. That is why a user should not be worried if someone
illegally intercepts that traffic. Taking Bluetooth characteristics into consideration, the
illegal interception of traffic is possible from quite a long distance. NFC technology is
less vulnerable to this risk.
A secure server could be used instead of a wristband for the needs of enterprises.
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